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Mechanical Reproduction in an Age of High Art
  Chris Barker 
Abstract
This paper reopens the question of the place of high art in the
period identified by Walter Benjamin as the age of mechanical
reproduction.  Walter Benjamin, Bruno Latour, and Adam Lowe
are wrong to think that mechanical reproduction has
transformed the concept of art, destroying the aura of art or
transmitting that aura from original to copy.  The concept of
art cannot be redefined by the modern change in the capacity
to reproduce art unless art was initially defined primarily by its
uniqueness/nonreproducibility.  Photographic reproduction has
caused major changes in the visual arts and in the way we
consume art, but reproductive techniques have a long,
continuous history that includes the production and
reproduction of exact, artistic copies.
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1. Introduction
This paper reopens the question of the position of high art in
the period identified by Walter Benjamin as the age of
mechanical reproduction.[1]  Rather than deal with the
ubiquitous and unanswerable question, “But is it Art?”, or the
even narrower question, “Is it High Art?”, this paper
challenges Benjamin’s assertion, developed and modified in a
recent article by Bruno Latour and Adam Lowe, that we are in
a period of mechanical reproduction in which art has lost its
aura. Benjamin’s argument is that all art loses its aura when it
can be copied.  A work of art that is copied is cut off from its
original position and place, its unique embodiment, and the
tradition that its unique history transmits.  Benjamin’s
epigraph, from Paul Valery’s Aesthetics, The Conquest of
Ubiquity, makes the stakes quite clear:  “we must expect great
innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts,
thereby affecting artistic innovation itself and perhaps even
bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of
art.”[2]  The first two predictions about technique and
innovation are elaborated and persuasively defended in
Benjamin’s essay.  But the third, at least as I argue here,
overreaches.  While it is sensible to say, with Benjamin, that
humanity’s modes of existence and production (e.g.,
cooperative, capitalist) change the way that we understand
art, one can still demur from the claim that our concept of art
has not endured throughout these changes.  Can we
demonstrate this without losing sight of Benjamin’s important
historical insights about changes in production, changes in art,
and changes in art theory?  That is the question posed in this
paper.
Benjamin’s 1936 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction,” makes a sweeping argument about
art and mechanical reproduction.  Benjamin’s 1931 essay,
“Little History of Photography,” deals more narrowly with
photography.  By reading the 1931 essay, we see that
Benjamin is actually addressing a fairly narrow question even
in the 1936 essay:  Does the photographing of art change our
relation to the concept of the work of art?  He writes that
photographic reproduction diminishes the distance between the
work of art and the consumer, which allows the place and
value of the original to fluctuate.  His thesis can be tested in
two ways.  First, one could focus on photographic reproduction
and show that the photographic reproductions themselves
meet the standard of a work of art, aura and all, and exist as
new works of art in parallel to the original, auratic art.  This is
the argument that Latour and Lowe try to make. 
After presenting their argument, I show that they do not
achieve what they seek to accomplish, and in fact address a
question quite different from Benjamin’s.  When Latour and
Lowe meet Benjamin on his own terms, they actually agree
with both his conception of an aura and his conception of
reproduction, despite the fact that their paper reads as a
challenge to his authority.  Second, one could focus on other,
non-photographic modes of reproduction that preceded
photography and that developed in parallel with it, especially
the reproductive engraving of oil paintings on copperplates
that was introduced sometime in the fifteenth century, and the
steel engravings that replaced copperplate engraving in the
1830s.  Earlier types of reproduction raise the same questions
as photographic reproduction and show that we ought not to
expect a revolution in the way that we perceive art, but rather
a Whiggish evolution at most.  Toward what end our art-sense
is evolving remains an open question.  Even to think about
photographic reproduction as accelerating and intensifying
changes that have a 600-year history overstates the
conclusion that we can draw.  A historical view usefully
unsettles Benjamin’s thesis in order to show that the individual
can find artistic value in a unique original, a non-unique
engraving, a non-unique reproductive engraving, and even a
non-unique photograph that is specifically made to be
reproducible.
In Part One, I summarize Benjamin’s description of the aura of
a work of art, and explore his thesis that photographic
reproduction destroys the aura.  In Part Two, I examine the
attempt made by Latour and Lowe to convict Benjamin of a
category error by posing a counter-example that aims to
disprove Benjamin’s thesis about the end of auras.  In Part
Three, I offer my own counter-example to show that
photographic reproduction is not the only or primary sense
that can be given to mechanical reproduction, and that Latour
and Lowe have not addressed Benjamin’s concern about
photography because of their selective use of examples.  In
my conclusion, I address the sociopolitical implications of the
Benjamin thesis. To anticipate the conclusion, a thicker
description of the last 600 years of the mechanical
reproduction of works of art shows that Benjamin, Latour and
Lowe, and prominent critics of reproductive engravings such as
William Ivins, Jr. fall afoul of reducing aesthetic questions
about the worth of art to narrower concerns with works of art
as scientific artifacts, “visual statements,” or politicized
statements to be judged by their exhibition value.
2. The explanation of the thesis
What is the aura for Benjamin?  In his “Little History of
Photography,” Benjamin uses the concept of aura to describe
early photographs that capture the “fullness and security” of
the sitters’ gazes.[3]  The aura of the early photograph grows
from the congruence of subject and technique.  In “The Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin
explains that these photographs memorializing dead loved
ones are the “last refuge” for the cult value of the picture.
Benjamin argued in “The Little History” that in the 1880s
Parisian photographer Eugène Atget began to kill the aura by
dismembering photographed scenes to focus on details.  This
was a way of seeing that led to surrealism and also to “arty”
abstractions of parts that did not make compositional wholes.
In doing so, Atget “initiates the emancipation of object from
aura, which is the most signal achievement of the latest school
of photography.”[4] 
Benjamin’s formal “definition” of aura (“A strange weave of
space and time”) is confusing, so much so that his description
is worth quoting at length:
Now, to bring things closer to us, or rather to the
masses, is just as passionate an inclination in our
day as the overcoming of whatever is unique in
every situation by means of its reproduction.
Every day the need to possess the object in
close-up in the form of a picture, or rather a
copy, becomes more imperative.  And the
difference between the copy, which illustrated
papers and newsreels keep in readiness, and the
original picture is unmistakable. Uniqueness and
duration are as intimately intertwined in the latter
as are transience and reproducibility in the
former.[5]
Original works of art endure as a unique testament of artistic
vision.  Relative to such enduring statements, a photograph is
disposable, “transient,” and judged only by its use-value.
Benjamin finds a political meaning in the function of the
reproduction, which brings the masses closer to the work of
art, which they may now cheaply acquire for their homes, use
carelessly as a cheap reproduction, and strip of place and time
and manner to gaze at the reproduced work of art in whatever
manner they desire. The reproduction divests even admittedly
singular and unique things of their uniqueness, undermining
memory and knowledge.[6]  Psychologically, the motivation
that Benjamin uncovers is confusing, because he writes about
the “passionate inclination” to overcome distances and the
need to “possess,” which seem to be at the root of art.  Is it at
the root of modernity or at the root of all art or just Western
art?  Is the surrealist “estrangement between man and his
surroundings” salutary?  The alienation of the authentic
individual from herself is often, and sensibly, a pejorative way
of talking about an art “under whose gaze all intimacies are
sacrificed to the illumination of detail.”[7]
For Benjamin, it appears to be a salutary and enlightening
process to move from auratic art to photography.  However,
there are dangers at the threshold and in immersing oneself in
this new world.  Photography-as-art is dangerous because of
the potential for commercialization through advertisement.
Benjamin not very kindly anticipated Warhol thirty-one years
before his soup cans were first exhibited by writing that
“photography…can endow any soup can with cosmic
significance but cannot grasp a single one of the human
connections in which it exists.”[8]  In his 1931 essay,
Benjamin wrote that “the impact of the photographic
reproduction of artworks is of very much greater importance
for the function of art than the greater or lesser artistry of a
photography that regards all experience as fair game for the
camera.”[9]  He explained:
the understanding of great works was
transformed at about the same time the
techniques of reproduction were being developed.
Such works can no longer be regarded as the
products of individuals; they have become a
collective creation, a corpus so vast it can be
assimilated only through miniaturization.  In the
final analysis, mechanical reproduction is a
technique of diminution that helps people to
achieve control over works of art—a control
without whose aid they could no longer be
used.[10]
Benjamin developed this ambitious and interesting explanation
of our loss of control over our cultural conditions further in
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  He
used a Marxist lens to prognosticate about the effects of the
material conditions of art production on the superstructure of
culture, including the fine arts and fine art theory.  For him,
fine art theory is shot through with mystifying concepts
(“creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery”) that lend
themselves to appropriation by fascists.  He expected that the
material conditions of art-reproduction will transform such
concepts because even the perfect reproduction abstracts from
certain material conditions of the original art’s unique
“presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place
where it happens to be.”  A reproduction cannot reproduce
down to the atomic level the structure of the original.  A
reproduction only reproduces a current time-slice of the
original, and thus deeply violates the history of the original—
all that is transmissible from its beginning.  Benjamin therefore
believed that the authority of the object is undermined
because its authority rests upon historical testimony of the
work of art concerning its own authentic, unique existence and
tradition.
Some reproductions, perhaps all reproductions prior to
photographic reproduction, do not unsettle time, place, and
history in the way that photographic reproduction does.
Benjamin called these “manual reproductions” and offered a
history of the previous 2500 years of reproduction, which
unfolded in four stages:  founding and stamping; the woodcut;
engraving and etching; and lithography.  As in the “Little
History of Photography,” Benjamin was primarily interested in
the influence that each mode of reproduction has on the
traditional art forms.  He found a kind-difference between the
latest evolution in the modes of reproduction and their earlier
precursors.  As Benjamin said, photography (which he
subsumed under the process of technical reproduction) takes
away the work of the hand and substitutes for it the work of
the eye.[11]  The eye of a photographer enhanced by a
camera sees more and differently from the eye of the
craftsman who translates the original work of art into another
medium using his handicraft.  Most importantly, such
photography enables relocation of the work of art into the
home of the connoisseur or some other locale where it can be
consumed at his convenience.  The reproduction thus
renounces uniqueness and place, and at the same time loses
its hold on tradition.
In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,”
Benjamin argued that an art-work’s aura originates in the
cultic value of art.  This cultic value has been secularized as a
cult of beauty and ultimately challenged by the revolutionary
means of production—photography—and the political rise of
socialism.  He briskly dismissed “theological” counter-
revolutions, such as l’art pour l’art, to conclude that the work
of art designed for reproducibility has transformed the art-
world, liberating us from art’s parasitic dependence upon
ritual.[12]  In this new world, there is no such thing as an
authentic print, an authentic film or, one presumes, an
apolitical work of art.  This is the era of art produced by and
for the people, and no longer the era of art produced by the
mystical genius for a suprahuman end.
There are two key issues at stake in Benjamin’s essay on the
age of mechanical reproduction.  The first concerns
photography as an art form and the second concerns the
photographic reproduction of works of art.  There are
legitimate concerns that we should have with photography as
an art form or as an element of a work of art, but Benjamin
tends to exaggerate the potential authoritarian dangers of the
photographic work of art.  I will consider four examples.  
First, writing about plays, Benjamin seems to equivocate in
Section IX, where he ties the aura both to the physical
presence of the stage actor (and so the film audience does not
perceive an aura around the actor, which seems wrong as a
matter of fact) and to the presence of an audience (although
the audience is not present for the painter or sculptor any
more than for the screen actor).  Benjamin interprets the film
actor’s art as an instance of alienation of the worker from the
product of his labor (“During the shooting he has as little
contact with it as any article made in a factory”) and interprets
the actor’s work as a “series of mountable episodes.”[13]
Nonetheless, cinema does not in itself tyrannize over the gaze
any more than a stage actor’s emotive performance or a lurid
part of a painting, attracting the viewer’s eye, could be said to
tyrannize over the eye of the viewer.  Moreover, the fact that
an actor can be startled by a loud sound and his reaction
edited into or out of a movie is, for Benjamin, the strongest
evidence that film abandons the realm of “beautiful
semblance.”  If this is true, it is because the actor’s audience-
persuading craft can be trumped by the director’s and editor’s
crafts.  Finally, Benjamin thinks it is only now, in the case of
illustrated magazines, that “[f]or the first time, captions have
become obligatory.”  Indeed, captions had been often required
to make sense of a specific theme or scriptural passage
represented in religious art and allegory or to direct the
viewer’s gaze.
There are similar problems with thinking that photographic
reproduction of art necessarily transforms the values of art. In
all cases, we cannot fully escape either the handicraft element
or the intellectual work done by framing a photographic scene.
We, the masses, can bring art closer to us and force it to
speak to us on our own terms.  We can see its reality in a new
way that is different from the way the artist saw it and from
the way that an interpreter engraving it would have seen it.
Reproduction often creates a powerful and artistic copy and
may even add luster to the original. Bruno Latour and Adam
Lowe argue this in a recent re-evaluation of Benjamin’s thesis.
3. The development of the thesis by Latour/Lowe
As consumers of art, we seem unable to free ourselves from
the type of cognitive architecture that makes colorful
advertising, a multitude of copies of the Mona Lisa, kitschy
paraphernalia sold at St. Peter’s in Rome, and the highest of
high art attractive to the consumer.[14]  The sociologist Bruno
Latour and Adam Lowe, an artist and founder of a Madrid-
based team of digital mediators who use the most advanced
technology to help produce and reproduce fine art, have
recently reframed Benjamin’s question by asking whether a
reproduction can have an aura, the type of presence that
comes from unique embodiment that Benjamin beautifully
evoked, and even the history that he attributed to original
works of art.[15]
Latour and Lowe adopt the first element in Benjamin’s essay,
the concept of the aura, but challenge the second element, the
diachronic account of the aura’s destruction by an age of
mechanical reproduction.  They develop their point using a
particular photographic representation of Veronese’s Marriage
at Cana that has been crafted with great technical ingenuity
and exactness by the company Lowe founded.  They ask
whether the reproduction is as valuable as the original painting
now hanging in the Louvre.  If it is not, why not?  Latour and
Lowe believe that the question of original or copy has been
made moot by the decisive question, “Is it [a work of art] well
or badly reproduced?”  Here, considering the duration of the
work of art that Benjamin found important, they believe that
copies enhance a work of art’s duration and actually enhance
its originality.  By copying, they imply, you pay homage to an
original and thus re-inscribe it with an aura.  They use the
analogy of tracing the Nile back to its source as an amusing
game parallel to the game of asking “Is this an original?” But a
consideration of the whole of the life of the river from the
vantage of the delta’s size (parallel to the view of Veronese’s
painting from the perspective of its continuing importance
today) is more consequential.  They imply that they are
interested in the entire trajectory of the production of the work
of art, one that includes not only the original work of art but
also stunning copies and works inspired by the original
painting.[16]
Latour and Lowe’s theory demonstrates that they are
concerned primarily with important works of art, although they
do not explain why these works of art are deemed to be
important.  They give a largely economic explanation of why a
copy might be less valuable than the original.  There may be
an asymmetry in the mobilization of resourcesᾹthe time,
money, and labor spent by the copyist might be less than that
of the original artist.  In a related argument, Latour and Lowe
recognize that there could be a gap in the techniques of
production between original and copy.  They argue that
historically such a gap was created by the invention of the
printing press and provide two examples to support their
general position concerning what make a work of art valuable. 
Each performance of a play is equally valuable, or at least is
able to be judged according to its artistic merits, because each
performance is unique.  Each is equally difficult to produce,
and an earlier performance of Macbeth, for instance, does not
make Akira Kurosawa’s job directing Throne of Blood any
easier.  Second, a copyist in a monastery doesn’t point out an
original manuscript among the many manuscripts that are
illuminated:  “…no copyist would have said this one is the
original while this one is a copy.”[17]  
If, they argue, a reproduction reduces the gap in the resources
used in the process of reproducing the original−that is, if
reproduction is costly−then the reproduction can be just as
much a work of art and achieve the elements of originality
that they think a work of art activates.  These elements are
the uniqueness of place (with Benjamin), accessibility or
availability to be seen by the viewer (which combines 
Benjamin’s concern with aura and with exhibition value), and
a deep respect for the surface features of the work of art.
They conclude that Benjamin made a category error when he
devalued copies:  “In effect, Benjamin confused the notion of
‘mechanical reproduction’ with the inequality of the techniques
employed along a [work of art’s] trajectory.”  Latour and Lowe
believe they have solved this problem by refusing to prioritize
the original time-slice and its techniques, thus allowing them
to see that the aura of a work of art can migrate from a
degraded original to a reproduction in which an equivalent
amount of time, labor, and thought are invested.
What is unfortunate, given the elegance of Latour and Lowe’s
essay and Factum Arte’s mission, is that their example
provides evidence for much less than they claim.  First, the
analogy they draw between the performance of a play and the
reproduction of a painting is a false one.  It is Benjamin’s
image, but it is used clumsily and not, as Benjamin used it, to
show a problem with the craft of the screen actor.  A script
needs staging for the playwright’s vision to be embodied; thus,
all performances have a certain non-original equality when
contrasted with the script.  A painting may have source
material (religious scripture, a view of the country from the
window), but it is unduly Platonizing to say that we are
reproducing something when we paint a painting.  In contrast
to the painter, whose work is complete when she has finished
painting, the playwright’s craft is only fully realized when it is
staged.  Second, Latour and Lowe seem to confuse the art of
illuminating a manuscript with the art of transmitting
knowledge through written texts.  Third and most obviously,
the exciting description of Factum Arte’s Veronese reproduction
shows that it is clearly not just a photographic reproduction,
and that its craft does not solely or even primarily rely on the
features of photography singled out as promising and
dangerous by Benjamin.  For Latour and Lowe and for
Benjamin, the photographic reproduction of Veronese’s
Marriage at Cana that you can purchase at the Louvre is not a
work of art.  
For Latour and Lowe, the facsimile created by Factum Arte and
placed in an original context in San Giorgio, Venice counts as a
painting.  The laborious process of scanning Veronese’s
painting and printing it on gessoed canvas significantly
complicates and refines the process of producing the Marriage
at Cana. This process is both mechanical, insofar as it makes
use of digital techniques and photographic reproduction, and
handcrafted.  Factum Arte’s photographic reproduction
involves all the basic materials and characteristics of the
Veronese painting.  Moreover, it possesses a handicraft, a
technique, so the whole can be said to be a product of an
intellectual process.  It can thus be considered an exact copy.
A true test of Benjamin’s thesis would have been of a purely
photographic reproductive process—a process that allows for
exact, instant replication of all the surface features of a work
of art without any alien artistic syntax mediating the process of
reproduction.  It is this possibility of a wholly new, unmediated
relation to art that we shall explore below.
4. A better counterexample
How can we test Benjamin’s thesis about the transformative
effects of art-less reproduction?  One approach would be to
show through close analysis of Benjamin’s writings that, for
him, there is no “nature” of a work of art.  There is instead its
original use value as an element of ritual; the subsequent
history of works of art is parasitic on that cultic value.  This
cultic value is secularized but retained, until the photograph
strips the object of its history and it becomes solely a tool to
be used by the dominant social power in the present day,
namely the masses.  Through conceptual analysis, we could
then show that other values are involved beyond the use of
the work of art as a tool of religion and politics.  Thus a
naturalist might show that images, as images, have a value
anterior to or different from a cultic value and that this appeal
(to our aesthetic sense, to sexual attraction, or to other
aspects of human culture) lingers and imbues a work of art
with an aura in our age as in any other age.
Alternatively, unpacking Benjamin’s encapsulated history of
reproduction allows us to clarify the ambiguity in “The Work of
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” namely the
equivocation between mechanical and photographic
reproduction.  If mechanical reproduction does not destroy the
aura of an art object, then the historical thesis founders
because Benjamin has specified the auratic elements of art
(uniqueness, place, and tradition) that reproduction threatens
or transforms.   Benjamin’s definition of the aura is misstated,
and because his thesis depends on it, the thesis about the
transformation of the modern world is also incorrect.  Those
not working within the Frankfurt School may have guessed
that this would be the case.  The question, as always in the
history of ideas, is “Why?”
When considered as an explanation of high art’s appeal, or its
aura, and an account of the changing political use of art,
Benjamin’s argument makes a great deal of sense.  However,
a powerful counterexample to Benjamin’s thesis is the fact
that auras exist throughout the long age of mechanical
reproduction.  The auras of works of art did not wither
because of the reproducibility of art and, in fact, some
reproductions had or grew over time to have their own distinct
artistic aura.  This demonstrates that there is a significant
problem with the argument that the work of art’s aura has
been transformed by the reproduction of art.  More
trenchantly, it challenges Benjamin’s description of the aura. If
reproducibility and reproduction do not cause the loss of aura,
then something is wrong with the aura thesis.
What is wrong with the aura thesis is the assumption that
cultic use value endows a work of art with an aura ab origine.
Although it is beyond the scope of the argument here to show
why Benjamin proposes the thesis that he does, the argument
that uniqueness endows art with an aura and that the aura
fades when uniqueness fades is too strong.  For more than
500 years, we have been reproducing art mechanically, and in
important instances, such as founding and stamping, the
reproductive processes go back thousands of years.  In
Benjamin’s concern to defend his thesis, he was not sensitive
to the difference between autographic and allographic 
prints.[18]  His concern was only with reproduction of works of
art by allographic engravers, and only with the effects of such
reproductions on the aura.  He was not even concerned with a
potent counterexample to his basic thesis, the autographic
engraving or fine art etching, which yields non-unique images
that are not located in any particular place and are not
restricted to the use that can be made of them.  This in itself
poses a basic problem for the thesis of “The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  But, granting that
Benjamin’s concern is with the effects of reproduction on
existing works of art and not about prints as works of art, how
does the thesis fare in light of older, pre-photographic modes
of reproduction?
On the subject of reproductive engravings, which were the
dominant mode of making an “exact repetition of pictorial
statements” before the rise of photography, William Ivins, Jr.,
a former curator of prints at the Metropolitan Museum of Art,
corrects what he thinks was a careless and mistaken
indulgence of reproductive engravings by writing the following
against reproductive engravers’ lack of respect for the true
surface of the painting:
As one thinks about this, it becomes obvious that
all record of the very things which constitutes
[sic] the work of art and which are visible to
everyone who looks at it with care and an
educated eye, was omitted from the old
engravings after works of art.  It was absolutely
impossible, by studying the old engravings, to
distinguish between the original [painting] and a
close contemporary copy or a fake of it, even of
the most blatant kind.[19]
Ivins’s point is that reproductive engravings were such an
inferior way of transmitting information about works of art
that they would transmit the same information about an
original or a copy.  For Ivins the engravers’ contempt for the
“gesture of the original maker’s hand” constitutes an indelible
mark against reproductive engravings.  
In the old processes, the [visual] report started
by a syntactical analysis of the thing seen, which
was followed by its symbolic statement in the
language of drawn lines. This translation was
then translated into the very different analysis
and syntax of the process.  The lines and dots in
the old reports were not only insistent in claiming
visual attention, but they, their character, and
their symbolism of statement, had been
determined more by the two super-imposed
analyses and syntaxes than by the particularities
of the thing seen.[20]
Although the non-critic may be less insulted by the tyranny of
the mediators than the professional appears to be, Ivins’s
judgment is enticing.  Through photography, art has changed
—more fundamentally even than it did during the Renaissance
or the baroque period.  In truth, our entire way of seeing has
changed.  The hold of the engraver as middleman over the
transmission of the visual statement of the original artist was
a “tyranny,” “the rule of a blinding and methodically blinding
visual common sense.”[21]  It killed both artistry and the
scientific knowledge that visual reports transmit so much more
simply than words.[22]  Happily, according to Ivins, the half-
tone photographic process locates the intrusive lines and dots
found in engravings below the level of our unaided vision, so
that reproductions of art are made without alien syntax or
generalizing abstractions.  The work of art itself is now made
available to us for the first time through a process of art-less
reproduction.  If this is true, and we have found an art-less
mode of reproduction, then we can finally test Benjamin’s
thesis about the transformation in the concept of art brought
about by the change in the material conditions of
reproduction.
In their defense, reproductive engravers can respond that
theirs is an art of translation just as worthy as any that moves
between media; that theirs is a different and legitimate
language, a different embodiment, and one that requires skills
and intelligence.  The greatest reproductive engravers
produced non-unique, transferable, placeless works of art. In
some cases (Swanenburg after Bloemaert, and Audran after Le
Brun), these engravers were more skilled and more artistically
successful than the painters whose work they copied.[23]
Even Ivins admits that the art basic to both painting and
printing is draughtsmanship, and that the engraver can be
more skilled at that art than the original painter.  Engravers,
although they were eventually admitted to England’s Royal
Academy of the Arts as full members in 1928, possess an
independent skill that was used to disseminate paintings
broadly from the seventeenth through the nineteenth
centuries.  
The integration of photographic techniques in the 1890s, a
change that allowed as many as 700 impressions to be
reproduced per hour, resulted in the gradual “erosion of…
independent craftsmanship” at a time when the nineteenth-
century workshop, with its “fragmentation of production” into
many different specialist tasks, already “drove a wedge”
between the manufacture of prints and intellectual input.[24]
 For Ivins, the wedge actually occurred much earlier, in the
early seventeenth century, when there developed an
intellectual division of labor among the original painter, the
draughtsman who drew in imitation of these paintings, and the
engraver who rendered what was drawn in the “house”
style.[25]  But the engraver might respond that the wedge
was not driven in that deeply, and that Ivins singles out a
problem or set of problems only with the economy of
reproductive engravings and not one that involves the concept
of mechanically reproduced works of art.
The commercial studios churning out reproductive engravings
may have been engaged more in manual reproduction and less
in art, but Ivins’s deep concern and even indignation stems, it
seems, from his belief that there is a process of visual
communication without syntax, one superior to that of slavish
imitators chained to a specialized task such as engraving fur
and the like.  He derides as retrograde the opinion that
engravings are the only dignified way to reproduce works of
art, and that half-tones and their shiny paper are vulgarities.
On the other hand, it is possible to disagree with his taste
and, if his argument is that progress in the realm of art
connoisseurship requires adherence to his sort of taste, to
reject his argument.  To put the same point differently, the
fact that an engraver translates the visual syntax of Manet or
Bouguereau into his own style and syntax may mean that…the
engraver has his own worthwhile, unique visual syntax![26]
Thus much holds for pictorial expression,[27] which has had
the same problems for at least 600 years. However, by
focusing on photographic reproduction, we are steered away
from seeing the antiquity of these questions, and the
improbability that a revolutionary new way of seeing art will
emerge from what seems to have been a long, gradual
process of change in art production and reproduction.
5. Summary and synthesis
Art, as art, represents a way of seeing the world, with an
independent, interpretable technique embodied in a concrete
medium.[28]  Whether this definition of art is wholly adequate
does not concern us.  On commonsense grounds one can
defend the claim, made in the preceding section, that there is
an intellectual contribution made by the reproducer of a work
of art and that the reproducer’s technique and insight might
create a work of art in its own right.  If so, how does this
change our relation to art?  For Walter Benjamin, there was a
time when all art had a sacred, expressive quality, but that
period was brought to a close by the capacity to mechanically
reproduce works of art in a multitude of identical copies. Ivins,
who knows prints as well as anyone, defines prints as exact,
reproducible visual statements that are more important for
their capacity to transmit knowledge than for their artistry. In
Ivins’s view, photographic reproduction ended the tyranny of
the middleman craftsman over the transmission of knowledge,
so that visual reports are now free of mediation and are solely
“provided by the thing seen.”[29]  Ivins thinks that the
photographic copy actually brings us back into conversation
with the original work of art.  Precise photographic
reproductions put us back in contact with the “indicia of
personality” represented by an art work—its surface and brush
strokes, its particularities.  Latour and Lowe dwell on one
particularly laborious and faithful copy of a work of art. For
them, this copy involved so much time, effort and ingenuity to
produce that it puts us very much in touch with the indicia of
personality of the original painting.
There are two things wrong with the conclusion that
photographic reproduction changes how we see art.  First,
framing effects and other matters of composition remain
relevant even in an age of precise photographic reproduction. 
Just as Michelangelo provided no guidance when he said that
his sculptures were in the marble block, so too is Ivins wrong
when he thinks that the photographic print is in the thing
pictured.  A second problem is that the definition of the aura
and the thesis about its decline do not answer our question
about the worth of the copy.  What is required, as Ivins notes,
is not an account of changes in the material conditions of art-
reproduction alone, but an interpretation of the meaning of the
art produced in those particular conditions.  
Benjamin, Latour and Lowe, and Ivins all offer such
interpretations:  All think, in one way or another, that
photography frees us from arbitrary, harmful, or tyrannous
conventions concerning the meaning and use of art. For
Benjamin, photography is the last nail in the coffin of sacred
art and a first step towards socialist art.  For Ivins,
photographic reproduction frees us from the tyranny and
mediocrity of the middleman, whether a draughtsman, an
engraver, a museum-employed restorer, a rich snob, or a
counterfeiter. For Latour and Lowe, photographic reproduction
sustains rather than dissolves the majesty and aura of old
masters.  Each of these scholars has offered a partial answer
to the question, What is the worth of a copy? For Benjamin,
the worth of the copy for “we, the people” is ambivalent:  it
can be used for valid socialistic purposes or authoritarian
propaganda.  For Ivins, the worth of a precise copy to the art
historian is extremely high.  For Latour and Lowe, the worth of
a copy is very high because it enables a new audience to be in
real contact with high art.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have divided Benjamin’s account of art into a
discussion of the concept of the aura and the history of its
decline.  The auratic part of Benjamin’s account of an art work
withstands scrutiny.  Unique things have auras about them.
They are rare and have a powerful political economy.  As
unique aesthetic expressions, they can provoke awe and
wonder. The association of art with the sacred and the cult
experience, as Benjamin argues, is a phenomenon that
persists today in the notion of a cult film and in the Marian
cult.  But the power of auratic art and its hold on language is
only part of “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction.” What of Benjamin’s diachronic account of the
loss of aura through the mechanical reproduction of art,
especially in a time when we have perfected the process of
photographic reproduction?  Has the concept of art changed
because of such changes in the material conditions of the
reproduction of art?[30]
For Benjamin, the replacement of manual reproduction by
mechanical reproduction allows us to consume, store, and
dispose of high art, apparently changing the way we view high
art, depreciating its presence, and even changing the concept
of art itself.  Latour and Lowe attempt to save most of
Benjamin’s thesis by demonstrating that today’s most refined
mechanical reproductions are as artistically rendered as an
original art work.  Their effort reinforces Benjamin’s account of
auratic art, and they argue that such copies reinforce the
concept of originality, resulting in the originals becoming even
more powerful.  Despite the efforts of Benjamin and Latour
and Lowe, however, the original thesis cannot be saved.  The
aura was never with the original to the extent or in the way
that Benjamin elaborated, and therefore it is not present in the
original to migrate to the copy.  Latour and Lowe’s example
suggests a general rule about handicraft and art, one which
Benjamin also saw, albeit incompletely.  Even the eye has a
handicraft that requires a technique for mediating between the
sight of the eye and the thing pictured.  
Latour and Lowe do not challenge the death-of-the-aura
thesis because they based their argument on a cherry-picked
example in which photographic reproduction closely
approximates handicraft.  To test Benjamin’s thesis about
process reproduction, we would need to show that a fully
photographic process that creates a multitude of reproducible
photographs, can also result in works of art.  To a great
degree, factors such as sensitivity to framing, the importance
of composition, the inclusion of strange or overlooked
subjects, and other aspects of artistic production have already
answered this question, at least from an empirical point of
view.  Photography is art, and we have not found the way of
presenting art without mediators who contribute their own
intellects, insight, and handicraft.
As an addendum, a plea should be made for art pluralism.
Instead of emancipating the eye from auras or charlatans or
conservators, we should accept that it is important to train the
eye.  Most importantly, studying how the very greatest artists
saw their world is vital for liberal education, because talking
about, reading about, and comparing engravings, photographs,
and paintings teaches us about how to see our world.
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